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REVISING SECTION 402A: THE LIMITS OF
TORT AS SOCIAL INSURANCE
Professor James Henderson*:
I am Professor James Henderson. I teach Law at Cornell, and
by now you know I am one of the reporters on the Restatement
(Third) of Torts project. 1 I am going to keep my remarks short
so we will have some time for discussion. I am going to make a
few comments about what I think a Restatement is, and then I
will address the one issue, really one of the few issues, on which
I disagree with everybody who has spoken thus far.2
So what is a Restatement? Professor Gray said that it is not law
which I think is an awfully positivistic approach. 3 John Austin, a
positivistic English legal scholar of the 19th century, defined law
as commands which are backed by the force of the sovereign. 4
* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1959,
Princeton University; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard University.
1. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Institute Announces Advisory Committee
for Restatement Product Liability Revision, BNA PRODUCT LIABILrrY DAILY,
June 11, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA file.
The American Law Institute announced the group of 20 judges,
professors, and private practitioners who will serve as the advisory
committee for the product liability portion of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts. The committee will work with the two co-reporters on the first
part of A.L.I.'s project to revise its influential 1979 treatise,
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The product liability section should be
complete within five years, but the complete revision is expected to take
up to 15 years. The co-reporters... are Cornell Law School Professor
James A. Henderson, Jr. and Brooklyn Law School Professor Aaron D.
Twerski.
Id.
2. See infra note 27.
3. See WILFRED E. RUMBLE, THE THOUGHT OF JOHN AUSTIN:
JURISPRUDENCE, COLONIAL REFORM, AND THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 3
(1982). ("For the legal positivist, in brief, 'all laws owe their origin and
existence to human practice and decisions concerned with the government of a
society, and.., have no necessary correlation with the precepts of an ideal
morality.'").
4. See JOHN AUSTIN, A Positivistic Conception of Law, in PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 27 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1980).
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Austin felt that any command that does not meet that definition is
not law. 5 This is similar to the theory espoused by Professor
Gray. 6 I take a broader view about the force of law and how law
is promulgated. When a parent tells a child, in a family setting,
"you are going to do this," that is law. Any source of norms that
is respected and followed by the addressees is, in a broad sense,
law. It is more helpful to think of it that way. The Restatement,
if we end up with one, fits this broader definition of law. 7
I believe the Restatement will have normative force. The pres-
tige of the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) 8 will give it weight.
However, I doubt that every court will adopt it. I do not think it
will meet the reception of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 402A, 9 which was an idea whose time had come. That origi-
5. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE
PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW I (1913) [hereinafter LECTURES] ("Every law
or rule (taken with the largest signification which can be given to the term
properly) is a command. Or, rather, laws or rules, properly so called, are a
species of commands.") (emphasis in original).
6. See Oscar Gray, Reflections on the Historical Context of Section 402A,
10 TOURO L. REv. 75 (1993).
7. See generally LECTURES, supra note 5.
8. The American Law Institute is a non-profit organization which has
objectives that include educating, "promot[ing] the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social
needs .... secur[ing] the better administration of justice,
and... encourag[ing] and carry[ing] on scholarly and scientific legal work."
The American Law Institute., Bylaws, 66 A.L.I. PROC. 659 (1989).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This provision
provides in relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
[Vol 10
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nal version was not a breakthrough, contrary to what Professor
Gray said.10 I do not think Prosser1 I thought it was either. 12 For
the original version there was only one case13 but the reporters
knew there were hundreds, even thousands on the way. It took no
real guesswork to see that.
Is a new Restatement needed now? Well, I confirm what Pro-
fessor Twerski said. 14 If you love confusion and lack of
certainty, then it is probably not needed, because the revision Will
bring clarity. 15 We think it is time for a revised version, and
Id.
10. See generally Gray, supra note 6 (discussing how section 402A was
not a breakthrough because it was just a combination of negligence law and
warranty law).
11. William Prosser was the Dean of the University of California School
of Law at Berkeley. He was also a professor at the Hastings College of Law.
Most notably, he was Reporter for the Second Edition of the Restatement of
Torts. Additionally, "[h]e wrote influential law review articles that predicted
and then celebrated judicial adoption of strict liability for defective products."
Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEo. L.J. 649, 661 n.70 (1990)
(book review).
12. See generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 848 (1966) ("[lIt seems
quite apparent that there is nothing in any of the strict liability cases to indicate
that the problems of proof will be dealt with in any different manner than in
those involving only negligence.").
13. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)
(en banc). This was the first court to apply a tort theory of strict liability
generally. The court held that:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being .... The
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves.
Id. at 900.
14. See generally Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter: A Prospective
Agenda, 10 TouRo L. REv. 5, 19(1993) (stating that lawyers may not like
precision or clarity since it prevents "strategic behavior").
15. See James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron Twerski, Will a New
Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM U. L. REV.
3
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more importantly, the A.L.I. thinks that it is time for a
revision. 16 1 predict that something is going to come out of it.
Our job, when we meet the advisors and go through the proc-
ess, will be to try to convince both plaintiffs' and defendants' at-
torneys that we, the committee for revision, have tried to make
the revision of section 402A balanced rather than adopt a one-
sided version. What should it formally and structurally look like?
I do not think it should look like a statute. Unlike a statute, there
will be neither a cap on damages provision 17 nor a period of re-
pose. 18
1257, 1262 n.27 (1993) (discussing issues in the field of products liability
which the new restatement will clarify).
16. See Hildy Bowbeer, The A.L.L 's Restatement on Products Liability:
Some Early Concerns and Suggested Revisions, BNA PRODUCT LIABILITY
DAILY, Aug. 2, 1993, available in Westlaw, BNA file; Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Institute Announces Advisory Committee For Restatement Product
Liability Revision, BNA PRODUCT LIABILITY DAILY, June 11, 1992, available
in Westlaw, BNA file.
17. The term "cap on damages" is referred to as "statutorily imposed
limits on recovery of noneconomic damages in tort actions." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 207 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g., Sander v. Geib, Elston, Frost
Professional Ass'n, 1993 S.D. LEXIS 125 at *1 (S.D. Sept. 15, 1993) ("The
trial court applied [the state cap on damages statute], which places a cap on the
medical malpractice damages which may be awarded to a plaintiff"); Cott v.
Peppermint Twist Management Co., 856 P.2d 906, 932-33 (Kan. 1993)
(where the court held that "the statutory cap [on damages] is applicable to any
suit, including breach of express warranty, in which personal injuries are
claimed); Figgie Int'l., Inc. v. Tognocchi, 624 A.2d 1285, 1293 (Md. 1993)
("Section 11-108 of the Court's Article establishes a cap of $350,000 for
noneconomic damages that may be awarded in a personal injury action."); see
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of
American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332, 1340 (1991)
("Several states have enacted legislative caps on noneconomic losses."); see
also Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (1993) (stating that some
"[aidvocates of tort reform have frequently criticized large punitive awards and
recommended caps on punitive damages, sometimes to absolute dollar
amounts, but often to amounts determined by some fixed multiple of
compensatory damages"). But cf Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones,
Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the
Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY's L.J. 797, 825 n.156 (1987) (condemning
4
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The revision which we are undertaking is not a reform meas-
ure. We are trying to read the cases and by and large conform to
the trends that we see in them. Where there is no trend visible,
we are going to call the shots because that is an integral part of
the project. We cannot be as precise as a statute.
Earlier Mr. Crofton talked about precision. 19 I would distin-
guish between precision and clarity. Precision implies detail.
However, for a Restatement to work, it cannot be full of detail. It
has to be clear so that the reader will not be confused. At the
same time it has to leave breathing room; space for the courts to
make their own versions of the themes. Therefore, this revision
will contain more detail in the comments and a great deal of de-
tail in the reporter's notes, in which we will put our research.
Above all, it cannot be one-sided.
When I was first appointed, 20 Plaintiff's Bar had, collectively,
what might pass for an aneurysm. For years I had written what
was widely viewed, and I think fairly viewed, as pro-defendant
caps on damages due to their arbitrary nature which may create
disproportionate results).
18. The period of repose is the period:
[Within which an action may be brought and is not related to the
accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much
less have been discovered. Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations
which begins running upon accrual of the claim, the period contained in
a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of
whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has
resulted.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4 (1987); see also Cavanaugh v. Abbott
Labs., 496 A.2d 154, 161-62 (Vt. 1985) (stating that a "statute of
repose ... establishes a maximum length of time within which a plaintiff must
commence a suit for injury even if the cause of action is not barred by any
applicable statute of limitation").
19. See generally Michael Crofton, From a Defense Attorney's
Perspective: "There is No Free Lunch," 10 TouRo L. REv. 55 (1993) (stating
that law should be clear enough so that judges have the confidence to make
rulings with respect to undisputed facts in motions for summary judgment).
20. Professor Henderson was approved on May 16 by the executive
committee of the American Law Institute to be a co-reporter on the product
liability portion of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Prominent Law
Professors Offered Positions as Co-Reporters on Product Liability Study, 20
PRoDUCr SAF-TY & LmiLrry REPORTER 547 No. 21 (May 22, 1992).
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material. 21 However, I never thought of myself as pro-defendant.
I identified what I thought were flaws in the system, and I did it
when it was not popular to do so. When I was your age, I was
surrounded by people who wanted ever greater expansion. There
was no frontier that was not worth crossing. I started my career
saying "wait a minute, do we really mean this?" Now, thinking
as an academic, I have shifted and I am politically in the middle
of the road. Maybe even in my off moments I am more liberal
than many writers.
I agree with Mr. Vargo in that the law and economics move-
ment has probably gone way beyond the point of contributing
21. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of
Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765,
766 (1983) [hereinafter Henderson, Passage of Time]:
[E]xposing manufacturers to product liability may be
counterproductive .... [P]roduct liability imprisons corporate
managers in patterns of 'deep play' [deferring action on improving the
safety of a product] such that the marginal incentives created by
exposure to liability direct them away from, rather than toward,
decisions that enhance the general welfare.
Id.; James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective
Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63
MINN. L. REV. 773, 784 (1978-79) [hereinafter Henderson, Renewed Judicial
Controversy]:
If the [two tests developed in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443
(Cal. 1978) are] applied literally, every plaintiff represented by at least
minimally competent counsel should succeed in shifting the burden to
the defendant; and no defendant however capably represented will
succeed, other than by agreeing to settle, in avoiding the retrospective
evaluation of its design choices by lay jurors.
Id.; James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1562
(1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Judicial Review] ("[C]ourts typically find the
defendant's product to be defective not only because it fails to meet minimum
standards of reasonable design, but also because it is not accompanied by
adequate warnings of the risks associated with its design."); James A.
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1975-76) [hereinafter Henderson, Expanding
Negligence] ("[w]here evaluation of the defendant's conduct requires an
assessment of complex technology").
6
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much in the way of new thinking in product liability. 22 Although
I have written in support of the law and economics theories, 23 I
share some of Mr. Vargo's criticisms.
This Committee on Revision did a study of every state, and just
completed the last of fifty-one jurisdictions, including the District
of Columbia. Thirty-four have expressly adopted some form of
risklutility balancing in design defect cases. 24 I think the
positions are overwhelming.
22. See John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567 (1992-93).
"Economists experience a great deal of consternation... in trying to place
economic or monetary values on intangible items, such as human life and well
being." Id. at 1627. "The core of any economic analysis is the measurement of
'economic costs' and 'economic benefits.'" Id. at 1628. "Nevertheless, public
policy decisions about any issue, including fee shifting, cannot be based solely
on the cost-benefit analysis of economics." Id.
23. See, e.g., Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 21, at
775, 805 (supporting the growing consensus that in design defect cases cost-
benefit analysis should be used, "with the injured plaintiff bearing the burden
of persuading the tribunal that costs associated with the defendant's design
choices including accident costs, exceeded the benefits of the design."); James
A. Henderson, Jr., Extending The Boundaries of Strict Products Liability;
Implications of the Theory of Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1980)
(discussing the economic policies behind holding certain types of sellers
strictly liable for harm caused by their defective products).
24. See, e.g., Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(relying on risk-utility balancing); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, 489 F.2d
1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (manufacturer owes duty to adopt reasonably safer
alternative designs); Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976)
("fault concept" retained); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co.,
445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983) (risk-utility balancing and unreasonable danger
tests); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) ("unreasonably
dangerous" standard), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988)); Miller v. Todd,
551 N.E.2d 1139, 1143 (Ind. 1990) ("claimant should be able to demonstrate
that a feasible, safer, more practicable product design would have afforded
better protection"); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md.
1976) (risk-utility balancing test employed); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co.,
602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980) ("ordinarily prudent company" test); Back v.
Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978) (risk-utility balancing); St.
Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283 (Me. 1988) ("danger-utility
test"); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Mich. 1984) ("the
overwhelming consensus among courts deciding defective design cases is in the
use of some form of risk-utility analysis"); Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324
113
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Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,25 the Director of the A.L.I., gathered
together a group of advisors to be on the Committee who would
N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982) (defectiveness of design to be determined by
whether designer exercised "reasonable care"); Sperry New Holland, A Div.
of Sperry Corp. v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993) (adopting risk-
utility balancing and rejecting the consumers expectation test); Carlton J.
Voss, Jr. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 450 N.E.2d
204, 207, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1983) ("[A] defectively designed product
is one... whose utility does not outweigh the danger inherent in its
introduction into the stream of commerce."); McCollum v. Grove Mfg. Co.,
293 S.E.2d 632, 638 (N.C. App. 1982) ("the duty of the
manufacturer... must be determined by the principles of negligence), aff'd,
300 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1983); Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d
129, 132 (S.C. 1982) ("In the final analysis, we have another of the law's
balancing acts and numerous factors must be considered, including the
usefulness and desirability of the product, the cost involved for added safety,
the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of
danger."); Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 912
(S.D. 1987) (value in product is compared with the level of dangerousness it
possesses); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979)
(product designs should be judged by a risk-utility standard); Morningstar v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979) ("the general
test for establishing strict liability [for design] is whether the involved product
is defective in the sense that it is not reasonably safe. . . "); Griebler v.
Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Wis. 1991) ("the test
[for defective design] is ultimately one of reasonableness."); Aller v. Rodgers
Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa 1978) ("The article sold
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be expected by the
ordinary consumer .... Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing
process. On one side of the scale is the utility of the product and on the other
side is the risk of its use."); Lankin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1990)
(purports to adopt consumer expectations test but employs risk-utility analysis
in ruling for defendant manufacturer); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. T.E. Tabert,
542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) ("In determining the
reasonableness of expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors
must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the
potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of
eliminating or minimizing the risk may be relevant. .... ").
25. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. is a Sterling Professor of Law at Yale
University. He is a co-author of many works including, FLEMING JAMES, JR.
AND GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1992);
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. AND JAN VET'ER, PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1987) and GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. AND ALBERT A.
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provide a balanced representation of well-known plaintiffs' law-
yers and well-known defendants' lawyers in the group. 26 Since
the revision should be unbiased, if either plaintiffs' lawyers or
defendants' lawyers give us a standing ovation, we are dead.
However, if both groups start throwing things at us, we have
done well. It is better to have something we can all tolerate rather
than a version which favors either plaintiffs or defendants.
I want to talk for a moment about the imputation of knowledge
issue that was discussed by almost everybody who has spoken so
far.27 I think the use of that principle in the revision would be a
EHRENZWEIG, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL: STATE AND FEDERAL (4th ed.
1980).
26. Named to the committee are professors Kenneth S. Abraham of the
University of Virginia School of Law; Paul Weiler of Harvard Law School;
Oscar S. Gray of the University of Maryland School of Law; Robert L. Rabin
of Stanford Law School; Gary T. Schwartz of the University of California at
Los Angeles School of Law; Marshall S. Shapo of Northwestern University
School of Law; Roger C. Cramton of the Cornell Law School; and Michael D.
Green of the University of Iowa Law School. Practitioners named to the
committee are Sheila L. Bimbaum of Skaden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Floma in
New York; Robert L. Habush of Habush, Habush & Davis in Milwaukee;
Paul D. Rheingold of Rheingold & McGowan P.C. in New York; Victor E.
Schwartz of Crowell & Moring in Washington, D.C.; Michael Traynor of the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund in San Francisco; Bill Wagner of Wagner,
Cunningham, Vaughan & McLaughlin in Tampa, Fla.; Conrad K Harper of
Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett in New York; and, John W. Martin Jr., vice
president and general counsel for Ford Motor Co. in Detroit. The A.L.I. also
named four judges to the committee: Dineen King of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; Hans A. Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court;
Vincent L. McKusick of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; and Robert E.
Keeton of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Institute Announces Advisory Committee For
Restatement Product Liability Revision, BNA PRODUCTS LiAB[LrTY DAILY,
June 11, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA file.
27. Imputed knowledge is defined as "knowledge attributed or charged to
a person because the facts in question were open to his discovery and it was his
duty to inform himself as to them." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 758 (6th ed.
1990). See, e.g., Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr. 805, 813
(1988) ("[M]anufacturers may not be held strictly liable for failure to warn of
risks of which they were unaware and could not have been aware by the
reasonable application of scientific knowledge available at the time of
distribution. Consequently, 'state of the art' evidence may well be relevant and
9
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mistake. I will not let the cat out of the bag by telling you that
the revised section 402A will not include imputation of knowl-
edge in the toxic pharmaceutical area. I probably overstepped my
orders by telling you this and it probably gives you a glimpse un-
der the tent.
However, as Professor Twerski mentioned earlier, the commit-
tee has no problem imputing knowledge in every other context. 28
Plaintiffs should not have to jump through hoops via Newton's
laws29 to prove their claim. I think it would be a terrible mistake
to impose liability in the form of imputation of knowledge where
a company truly could not know of the sometimes enormous risks
and it is ostensibly public minded, though for a profit. It is a
mistake to think that those risks are insurable. They are not.
At lunch we had a fruitful, robust discussion, and it was sug-
gested to me that we could cap insurance, maybe with huge de-
ductibles, as a way to protect the insurance companies'
liability. 30 However, that is essentially a refusal to write
insurance.
admissible in a failure to warn case."); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297,
307 (Idaho 1987) ("Knowledge of the product's risks based on reliable and
obtainable information is imputed to the seller.").
28. See generally Twerski, supra note 14.
29. "Newton's first law states that, if a body is at rest or moving at a
constant speed in a straight line, it will remain at rest or keep moving in a
straight line at constant speed unless it is acted upon by a force." 7 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 306 (15th ed. 1982).
30. A deductible is the amount that the insured is required to pay when
found liable for someone's injury. The insurer is responsible for paying any
amount above the deductible. For example, if an auto manufacturing company
takes out an insurance policy to protect itself against lawsuits and its deductible
is one million dollars, the auto company will have to pay the first one million
dollars for which it is liable in a lawsuit, and the insurance company will pay
any amount above one million dollars if the auto company is found liable for
an amount greater than one million dollars. The higher the deductible, the less
money the insurance company will have to pay and the more exposure to
liability for the insured. See ROBERT H. JERRY, 1I, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW § 93, at 441 (1987) ("[A] 'deductible' provision causes the
insurer and insured to share the loss. When insurance coverage is subject to a
deductible, the insured bears that portion of the loss up to the amount of the
deductible. However, the amount of the deductible bears no relationship to the
extent of coverage of a property's total value."); ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC
[Vol 10
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I teach insurance, and we contrast insurance and gambling from
the first day of class. Insurers do not like to gamble. So, what if
we were to occasionally impose enormous crushing liabilities on
producers of toxic chemicals or pharmaceuticals? I cannot tell
you what would happen. I do not think that insurance companies
could write insurance which would adequately classify the risks.
Insurance companies charge a premium which reflects the in-
sured's relative contribution to the risk pool which is comprised
of the insurance company's clients. People do not ordinarily
write life insurance on a flat rate, i.e., the same rate for every-
body. 31 The way a life insurance company classifies the risk you
present to them is by determining your age, your sex, and your
health, among other things, and they will charge you according to
the risk they feel you present. If the risks are, per se, unpredict-
able, then it is a contradiction in terms to think that they could
adequately be classified. My hunch is that something like the
following scenario would result if a system was put in place
which would require insurance companies to insure risks that
were not foreseeable at the time the policy was taken out. The
producers of products exposed to these potential risks would seek
insurance and not be able to find it. And, if they could find it, it
would be at exorbitant rates. The actuaries would compute a sum
of money that represented the basic risks presented based on the
statistics they had. Whatever figure they came up with, they
would multiply it by ten and maybe write some insurance. This
would be very, very costly to the insured. 32
TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 3.6(a), at 131 (1971) ("Sometimes... there is
added to the clause the phrase 'under x per cent, which is deductible.' In such
case, the insured always bears that part of the loss up to the deductible
percentage, and the underwriter pays only the excess.").
31. See, e.g., Robert Lowe, Genetic Testing and Insurance.: Apocalypse
Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REv. 507, 512-13 (1991) ("If workers paid the premium
themselves, the younger, healthier employees might opt for less expensive
coverage. The flat rate works as a cross subsidy with premiums charged for
younger and healthier workers subsidizing the older and less healthy
employees.").
32. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance
Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 651 (1985) (stating that insurance companies
11
Henderson: Limits of Tort as Social Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TO URO LAW REVIEW
My hunch is that firms, in any event, would not obtain insur-
ance policies for amounts beyond what they are worth. For ex-
ample, if a firm was exposed to two hundred billion dollars of
damages and the firm was only worth twenty billion dollars, it
would be silly for that firm to write insurance for the full expo-
sure to liability. At some point it would be cheaper simply to go
under. Could the purchase of hundreds of billions of dollars of
insurance be required as a prerequisite for entry into certain mar-
kets, where there are many unforeseeable risks that are consid-
ered in insurance plans? Could these companies be given no
choice? That is politically dangerous and I would not want to run
on that platform. For example, if that system was to cause prices
of drugs to rise dramatically, then what would we have done? We
would have added to the costs that the new President and his
lovely wife promised to reduce, namely containing the costs of
the health care. 33
Now, what do I do with the ogreisitic aspects of leaving the
costs on the victims? I do prefer shifting the costs to the firms.
As I explained at lunch, I voted for President Clinton, and I am
not ashamed to say that I was led to that by my children who
badgered me to have a conscience and believe in America. My
children are becoming more liberal and believe that the victims of
that kind of bad luck ought to have someplace to look for what I
would call social insurance.
should charge the insured based on "their expected losses so the better risks do
not leave the pool because they are required to subsidize the inferior ones").
33. While campaigning in South Carolina, Clinton was quoted as saying
that:
Under our plan we will keep what is best about American health care;
the right to pick your doctor, the right to choose your health care
provider. But we will control costs, put more money into basic,
primary, preventive-health-care clinics in inner cities and rural areas,
put more money into health-education programs in the schools and the
workplaces, and stop the kinds of mindless explosions of costs that are
not making us a healthier people.
Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton Braves 'Rocks' on GOP Turf, WASH. TIMEs, Sept.
6, 1992, at A4; see also A New Framework for Health Care, N.Y. TIMEs,
September 23, 1993, at A20 (outlining the newest proposal by President
Clinton for his health care plan).
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When I came here, I thought Mr. Vargo and I would be at each
other throats. I bulked up in anticipation for that happening.
However, my opinions are close to his. 34 Although we use
different language, we are not that different. He would tell me
that social insurance is inadequate. To that I would reply that he
wants tort to replace otherwise nonexistent social insurance. He
does not want tort to play a deterrence game, but rather a social
insurance game. I would tell him that his opinion is anti-con-
sumer and unconscionable. Although it is pro-plaintiff, injured
plaintiffs are a small subset of consumers. The rest of us would
pay through the nose and collectively receive pennies on the dol-
lar. The tort system is a miserable flop as a social insurance sys-
tem. 35 I am not against tort, but just do not sell it to me as social
insurance. Most of the money goes to the lawyers.
Now, I am talking to the wrong group about limiting tort as a
form of social insurance. You are going to be out there getting
your piece of the pie. But, from a larger view, to suggest that we
ought to shift these enormous losses when they occur strikes me
as bad. We should keep the pressure up, get behind Mrs. Clinton
and contain costs. To accomplish these goals we should use a re-
source other than tort, that would not be as spectacular as tort. 36
The empirical studies I have read suggest that when tort does
pay, it pays on a random, unfair, and speculative basis. 37 The
worse the injury, the less the recovery as a percentage of the cost
34. See supra note 19.
35. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal
Injury, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 17, 35 (1986) ("Almost anything is likely to be
better than the common-law tort system that lawyers have devised.").
36. See generally O'Connell, supra note 35 (suggesting workers'
compensation, no-fault insurance, and alternatives in contract).
37. See, e.g., New York State Insurance Dept., Automobile
Insurance... For Whose Benefit?; A Report to Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller, (1970). See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, Inside The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 731, 761 (1992) ("[W]hile success rates might be expected to respond in
an observable manner to doctrinal change, award sizes are more likely to
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of the injuries, and the less you are injured in tort, the more the
recovery may be.38
I almost sound like Peter Huber, 39 that M.I.T. person from
Harvard Law School. I think much of what he says is baloney
and overstated, but he has popularized the notion that we have
met the enemy and they are lawyers. 40 I agree with that because I
do not think tort-run social insurance is pro-consumer. I really do
not. It is pro-lawyer, and I would not want to see it implemented
as a working protective device for consumers; I promise you it
will not under the revised Restatement.
38. See generally William W. Falsgraf, Should Curbing Medical
Malpractice Litigation Be Part of the Solution? No: Exploding the Myths, 78
A.B.A. J. 43 (1992) ("[P]roposals to limit non-economic damages deprive the
most seriously injured victims of full compensation-essentially the worse you
are injured, the less you recover."); Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 37
(supporting the theory that there is a pro-defendant trend in product liability
recovery); James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV.
479 (1990) (supporting the theory that there is a pro-defendant trend in product
liability recovery).
39. Peter Huber received a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School and a
Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is currently an
Associate Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the
author of several law review article including, The Intercircuit Committee, 100
HARv. L. REV. 1417 (1987) and Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985). He is
also the author of the book PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE COURT ROOM (1991).
40. See James H. Andrews, Court's Disposal of 'Junk Science,'
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 30, 1993, at 13.
In Huber's view, American courtrooms are being swept by a tidal wave
of testimony from scientists and physicians who are proffering half-
baked, untested, and even specious notions about the causes of illness to
help people recover multimillion-dollar awards from chemical and drug
companies and other deep-pocket corporations. Huber has exhorted
judges to probe more deeply before allowing "expert witnesses" to
testify. But Huber has critics among scientists, legal scholars, and
lawyers, who say he has overstated his argument and has engaged in the
same selective use of data that he charges "junk scientists" with.
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Finally, I want to note that tort as social insurance is not law
anywhere. However, there is some dictum in some states. 4 1 Pro-
fessor Twerski shocked me when he admitted to three states
where it is mentioned as dictum, 42 and Professor Gray said that
there is a case in Massachusetts. 43 However, the Massachusetts
case is a design defect case, and we are permitting tort to be used
as social insurance in those types of cases. I do not want strict li-
ability to be used in toxic pharmaceutical cases.44 It was done in
Beshada45 and the result in that case was not a good one.
41. See, e.g., Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 123 (Cal. 1985)
(stating that "[t]he paramount policy of the strict products liability rule
remains the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating
otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects"); Weems v. CBS
Imports Corp., 612 P.2d 323, 325 (Or. 1980) (adopting as the test for strict
liability "whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing
the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive
knowledge of the condition of the product").
42. See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233 (Haw. 1988)
(rejecting the use of the state-of-the-art defense in asbestos cases), aff'd., 960
F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992); Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A.2d 408, 428 (Pa.
1984) (stating that "in a strict liability case, principles of negligence have no
place"); Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 797 P.2d 527, 531-32
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "foreseeablilty is not an element of strict
liability claims because the focus is not on the manufacturer's conduct, but on
the expectations of the consumer").
43. Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3
(Mass. 1992) (stating that strict liability for design defect will be permitted
without regard to foreseeability).
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that "a manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a
prescription drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and accompanied
by warnings of its dangerous propensities that were either known or reasonably
scientifically knowable at the time of distribution"); Grundberg v. The Upjohn
Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991) (holding that sellers of prescription drugs
"when the products are properly prepared and marketed and distributed with
appropriate warnings, should not be held strictly liable for the 'unfortunate
consequences' attending their use."). But cf. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-57 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying the doctrine of strict
liability to prescription drugs).
45. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
This was a consolidated suit where the plaintiffs were employees and families
of employees who had worked for asbestos producers and who had contracted
15
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Beshada stands alone, 46 and it should. I call it "The Plague Ship
Beshada" because I hope it never docks at another shore again.
illnesses connected to exposure to asbestos. Id. at 592. The connection
between the illness and asbestos was unknown at the time that these employees
were exposed. Id. at 542. The court held that the defendants could not assert
the state-of-the-art defense. Id. at 547. The court reasoned that "[e]ssentially,
state-of-the-art is a negligence defense .... But in strict liability cases
culpability is irrelevant. The product was unsafe. That it was unsafe because of
the state of technology does not change the fact that it was unsafe." id. at 546.
46. See generally Andrew T. Berry, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp.: Revolution-Or Aberration-In Products Liabiliy Law, 52 FORDHAM L.
REviEw 786, 787 (1984) (arguing that Beshada "was an unprecedented
departure from prior products liability cases" and "concludes that Beshada can
and should be limited to its unique factual situation).
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